In the classical privacy amplification problem Alice and Bob share information that is only partially secret towards an eavesdropper Charlie. Their goal is to distill this information to a shorter string that is completely secret. The classical privacy amplification problem can be solved almost optimally using extractors. An interesting variant of the problem, where the eavesdropper Charlie is allowed to keep quantum information rather than just classical information, was introduced by Konig, Maurer and Renner. In this setting, the eavesdropper Charlie may entangle himself with the input (without changing it) and the only limitation Charlie has is that it may keep at most b qubits of storage. A natural question is whether there are classical extractors that are good even against quantum storage.
INTRODUCTION
In the classical privacy amplification problem Alice and Bob share information that is only partially secret towards an eavesdropper Charlie. Their goal is to distill this information to a shorter string that is completely secret. The problem was introduced in [4, 3] . The classical privacy amplification problem can be solved almost optimally using extractors. 1 An interesting variant of the problem, where the eavesdropper Charlie is allowed to keep quantum information rather than just classical information, was introduced by Konig, Maurer and Renner [15, 16] . In this setting, Alice holds a string x chosen uniformly from {0, 1} n and sends it to Bob. The eavesdropper Charlie listens on the line, and entangles itself with the string x without changing it. That is, it enters the mixed state ρ x depending on x. The only limitation Charlie has is that it may keep at most b qubits of memory. The big question now is whether the adversary becomes more powerful by having b qubits of quantum memory rather than just b bits of classical memory (the answer to that turns out to be positive) and whether Alice and Bob can still solve the privacy amplification problem in the presence of a quantum adversary.
We say E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m is a (k, b, ) extractor against quantum storage, if for any distribution X on {0, 1} n with k min-entropy, and any b qubits of storage the adversary stores about this distribution, the output distribution E(X, U t ) is close to uniform. See Definition 3.1 for the precise details. This situation naturally occurs in analyzing the security of some quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols and in bounded-storage cryptography. For example, [5] show a generic way of using extractors against quantum storage to prove the security of certain QKD protocols. Using extractors for bounded-storage cryptography demands more from the extractor (it should be "locally computable"), but also allows more specific assumptions about the source distribution (see, e.g., [18] and [17] ).
Special cases of the problem are also of great interest. The first such example appears in [1, 20, 2] where random access codes are studied. Alice and Bob share a random length n string x on which the eavesdropper Charlie knows b bits of information. If Charlie is classical, then choosing a random i ∈ [n] and outputting x i results in an almost uniform bit. The question studied in the above papers is whether the same also holds when Charlie is quantum and may hold b quantum bits. It was shown in [1, 20, 2 ] that the answer is positive, and this gives an extractor against quantum storage, albeit, with a single output bit.
Konig, Maurer and Renner [15, 16] show that the pairwise independent extractor of [14] is also good (and with the same parameters) against quantum storage. Using the same techniques the result can also be extended to using almost pair-wise independence [26, 11] . Another classical extractor for very high min-entropies was shown to hold against quantum storage in [9] (the classical version appears, e.g., in [7] ). Konig and Terhal [18] showed that any single output extractor is also good against quantum storage. They also showed that any extractor with error , has at most 2 O(b) error against b quantum bits. Thus, if some extractor has a good dependence on the error (as is often the case) one can make the extractor good against b quantum storage by taking a longer seed (often, longer by only O(b) bits).
To summarize, many techniques and constructions generalize and work well against quantum storage. Yet, in spite of much effort, all of the above methods require seed length that is at least min {Ω(m), Ω(b)}, where m is the extractor's output length and b is the bound on the quantum storage. In contrast, classically, there are many explicit constructions with poly(log(n)) seed length (where n is the extractor's input length), some even with logarithmic seed length. Some of these constructions are summarized in Table 1 . A natural question that repeatedly appears in the above mentioned papers is whether one can show a logarithmic seed length extractor against quantum storage.
It is tempting to conjecture that every extractor against classical storage should also be good against quantum storage. However, Gavinsky et. al. [10] show an example of an extractor that works well against classical storage but fails even against much shorter quantum storage.
In this work we show that Trevisan's extractor [28] is also good against quantum storage, with somewhat weaker parameters.
The seed length is O(log n) and matches the lower bound up to constant multiplicative factors. The error is not that good, as it can not get below, e.g., 1/k. The number of extracted bits is about log n ( k b ) 1/c = k Ω (1) . This should be compared with about (k − b) 1−ζ , for ζ arbitrarily small, in Trevisan's extractor against classical storage. Thus we have a polynomial loss here compared to the original classical scheme.
Our work gives the first solution to the privacy amplification problem against quantum storage with logarithmic seed 2 The constant c we currently achieve is c = 15.
length. Table 1 also summarizes the parameters of the other known classical extractors against quantum storage. We believe that more classical extractor constructions should also be good against quantum storage.
The technique. One way to view Trevisan's extractor is as follows. We already said a random access code is a classical extractor outputting a single bit. One can take m independent copies of this extractor and get an extractor outputting m bits. The price of this is that the seed length becomes Ω(m). To fix this, in Trevisan's extractor a short seed of length O(log n) is used to create m sets that are pair-wise nearly-disjoint. The analysis shows that in the classical setting the m nearly-disjoint sets can replace the m independent sets, resulting with m output bits but only O(log n) seed length.
Can this also work against quantum storage? Ambainis et al. [2] show a random access code is a single-output extractor against quantum storage. Konig and Terhal [18] show taking m independent copies of this extractor is good against quantum storage. What about the derandomized version with pair-wise nearly-disjoint sets? Is it also good against quantum storage?
The analysis of Trevisan's extractor uses the fact that it is built upon a reconstructible pseudo-random generator (PRG). Loosely speaking, in such structures any mechanism that breaks the extractor (i.e., distinguishes its output E(x, U ) from uniform) can be used together with a short advice to reconstruct its input x. At first sight, this kind of reasoning looks very well suited to generalizations to extractors against quantum storage. Assume Charlie can distinguish the extractor output E(x, U ) from uniform using b qubits of storage. Then, the reconstruction property tells us we should be able to reconstruct x using Charlie's reconstruction procedure, his b qubits of information and a short advice of a classical bits. Thus, it seems we should be able to reconstruct x ∈ {0, 1} n using only a + b qubits. Basic Quantum information theory tells us then that a + b ≥ n, or putting it differently, whenever b < n−a, we output uniform bits. A fundamental problem that arises in this approach is that quantum advice is fragile, and using it once degrades it. This is also the main problem that appears in [1, 20, 2] .
Simplifying things, a key ingredient in our solution is the following. It is true that any query to Charlie may destroy the b qubits Charlie holds. Yet, we tackle this problem by taking a variant of Trevisan's extractor where the binary error correcting code is replaced with a locally, list-decodable binary code. The main advantage in this variant is that the number of queries the reconstruction algorithm makes to the eavesdropper Charlie is small (poly-logarithmic in n rather than linear as in Trevisan's algorithm). As the number of queries q is small, we can take as advice q copies of the system Charlie holds.
The price of this trick is that the reconstruction algorithm can now learn just one bit of the input, rather than the whole input as in Trevisan's extractor. The good thing, though, is that the reconstruction algorithm can learn any bit of its choice. We are now back to the familiar random access codes situation, which was already solved in [1, 2] . A new problem that comes to the surface is that the analysis requires random access codes of subsets. We explain this technical problem (and other problems we encounter) and its solution in detail in the technical sections. no. of truly no. of Against classical storage Against quantum storage random bits output bits
Almost pair-wise ind., [26, 11] , based on [15] Table 1 : Milestones in building explicit strong (k, b, ) extractors against b storage, in the classical and quantum setting. To simplify the parameters, the error is a constant and k = n.
PRELIMINARIES
We begin with some standard notation. A distribution D on Λ is a function D : Λ → [0, 1] such that a∈Λ D(a) = 1. x ∈ D denotes sampling according to the distribution D. U t denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1} t . We measure distance between two distributions with the varia-
A superposition is a vector in some Hilbert space. H 2 b denotes a Hilbert space of dimension 2 b . A general quantum system is in a mixed state-a probability distribution over superpositions. Let {p i , |φ i } denote the mixed state where superposition |φi occurs with probability pi. The behavior of the mixed state {pi, |φi } is completely characterized by its density matrix ρ = i p i |φ i φ i | in the sense that two mixed states with the same density matrix have the same behavior under any physical operation. Notice that a density matrix over a Hilbert space H belongs to Hom ( H(·) denotes the binary entropy function
where p x is the probability the random variable X takes value x. The mutual information I(X : Y ) of a pair of random variables X, Y is defined to be I(X :
For other equivalent definitions, and more background on the subject see, e.g., the book by Cover and Thomas [6] .
The Shannon entropy and the mutual information functions have natural generalizations to the quantum setting. The von Neumann entropy S(ρ) of a density matrix ρ is de-
is the multi-set of all the eigenvalues of ρ. Notice that the eigenvalues of a density matrix form a probability distribution. In fact, we can think of the density matrix as a mixed state that takes the i'th eigenvector with probability λ i . The von Neumann entropy of a density matrix ρ is, thus, the entropy of the classical distribution ρ defines over its eigenstates.
The mutual information
where XY is the density matrix of the system that includes the qubits of both systems. For more details see, e.g., [21] .
EXTRACTORS AGAINST QUANTUM STORAGE

Extractors and privacy amplification
Alice holds a string x drawn from the uniform distribution. An adversary C is given some partial information about x in two ways:
• First, C is told a small subset X ⊆ {0, 1} n from which the input x is taken.
• Second, we let C keep b bits of information about x.
In the classical world we model the second item by two arbitrarily correlated random variables X and C, with the constraint that C is distributed over {0, 1} b . In the quantum world, we say an (n, b) quantum encoding is a collection {ρ(x)} x∈{0,1} n of density matrices ρ(x) ∈ H 2 b , and we let C hold any (n, b) quantum encoding of X.
Our goal is to find a function E :
, which is the distribution obtained by picking x ∈ X, y ∈ U t and outputting E(x, y), "looks uniform" to the adversary C. We define this as follows. We say a boolean test
We say D 1 is -indistinguishable from D 2 if no boolean POVM can distinguish D1 from D2. We define:
Equivalently, we could have required that
see [21, Thm 9 .1] for more details about the trace norm and the equivalence. In the definition we could also have replaced the condition "for any distribution X ⊆ {0, 1} n with H∞(X) ≥ k" with the condition "for any flat distribution X ⊆ {0, 1} n with H∞(X) ≥ k", as any distribution X ⊆ {0, 1} n with H ∞ (X) ≥ k can be expressed as a convex combination of flat distributions with min-entropy k.
We similarly define a (k, b, ) strong extractor against classical storage, where we allow the adversary C two types of information: first we tell C that x is drawn from a small subset X ⊆ {0, 1} n , and second, we let C store b bits of information about x (equivalently, in Eqn(1) we should use the variational distance instead of the trace norm). However, classically, these two types of information are redundant. Formally,
Proof. Let X be a flat distribution over 2 k elements. Assume C keeps b bits of information. Except for probability , C gets a value c such that Pr
strong extractor is not necessarily a (k, b, 2 ) strong extractor against quantum storage. One formal reason is that it is not clear how to define the conditional distribution (X|C = ρ) when C may be quantum. Renner [25] defines smooth min-entropy for this case, but still it is not clear how to define the marginal distribution itself as it depends on which measurement C chooses to take later.
Another way to look at the problem is as follows. In the classical world, C has to first choose c bits of information about x which already determines a distribution X = (X|C = c), and only then an independent random seed y ∈ {0, 1} t is chosen and E(x, y) is calculated. In the quantum world, however, things are not that simple. C first chooses what c qubits to store. This by itself does not determine any classical distribution X on {0, 1} n . Next, an independent random seed y ∈ {0, 1} t is chosen and E(x, y) is calculated. Finally, C may choose which measurement to make based on x and y. The problem is that it may be possible for C to make a measurement that will correlate the resulting distribution X with the seed y, making the extractor useless. This point of view is further explained in [18] .
Random access codes
A similar problem to the one above appears in random access codes. We now explain what random access codes tained by sampling x ∈ X, y ∈ {0, 1} t and outputting |y, E(x, y) ⊗ρ(x). Similarly, U t+m ×ρ(X) denotes the mixed state obtained by sampling w ∈ {0, 1} t+m , x ∈ X and outputting |w ⊗ρ(x). are, as this will turn out to be a basic building block in our result. A fundamental result in quantum information theory, Holevo's theorem [13] , states that no more than b classical bits of information can be faithfully transmitted by transferring b quantum bits from one party to another. Formally,
If Y is any random variable obtained by performing a measurement on the encoding, then
In view of this result, it is tempting to conclude that the exponentially many degrees of freedom latent in the description of a quantum system must necessarily stay hidden or inaccessible. However, the situation is more subtle since the recipient of the n qubit quantum state has a choice of measurement he can make to extract information about their state. In general, these measurements do not commute. Thus making a particular measurement will disturb the system, thereby destroying some or all the information that would have been revealed by another possible measurement. Indeed, Ambainis et. al. [1] ask whether there exists an (n, b) quantum encoding {ρ(x)} such that the recipient can learn any bit x i of his choice. I.e., they define: [20, 2] show that any quantum n p → t encoding must have t ≥ (1−H(p))n. In fact, this lower bound also holds if we relax the worst-case condition ∀ x ∀ i Trace(E i x i f (x)) ≥ p and replace it with the average-case condition ∀
In this paper we need random access codes that are defined for subsets of {0, 1} n . Namely,
We prove:
Any quantum
Proof. We use the proof technique of [1] . First, one can turn the → O(t · T ) encoding, with T = O(log −1 /δ 2 ), as follows. The new encoding is T copies of the original encoding. The decoding is the majority vote over the T decodings of the T copies. By Chernoff, the probability of error is at most . Fix = c n 2 for some constant c that will be determined later. Consider some f ∈ F and its encoding ρ = ρ(f ). For every i ∈ [n] the measurement E i recovers fi with probability at least 1 − , i.e., almost with certainty. It is shown in [1] , 4 that applying sequentially the measurements E 1 , . . . , E n results in a distribution Y that outputs (f 1 , . . . , f n ) with probability at least 1 − 4n
Taking c small enough, we recover y with probability 1 2 . By Holevo's theorem, T t ≥ I(U F : Y ) ≥ 1 2 log(|F|). For the second item notice that one can turn a F 1−δ → t encoding into another F 1− → O(t · T ) encoding, using T = 2 log 4δ , and the rest is as before.
Oded Regev showed us an example where the bound in Theorem 3.2 is tight. Partition the n bits to √ n blocks each of size √ n. Take the set F to be all bit strings containing exactly one 1 in each block. F has Θ( √ n · log n) entropy. Yet, consider the following random access code (RAC) that uses only O( √ n + log n) bits. Given f ∈ F with indices
is a randomly chosen hash function from a family of pairwise independent hash functions. When asked for the value of a bit of the input, say, the k'th bit in the j'th block, the decoder just checks whether h(k) = h(i j ). It outputs 1 if yes, otherwise 0. By the pairwise independent property, we output the correct answer with probability 2/3 for each question. We proved Theorem 3.2 with the definition that is worstcase over i. We remark that the average case version is false. For example, if F is the set of all n bit strings of weight at least 2 3 n, there is a trivial random access code of length zero that for all f ∈ F succeeds on average over i with probability at least 2/3. Thus, here there is a crucial difference between worst-case and average-case complexity over i.
LOCAL LIST-DECODING
A code is a function C : Σ n → Σn. We identify a binary code C with its image C = {C(x) | x ∈ Σ n }. The distance d of the code is the minimum Hamming distance between two codewords in C. The balls of radius d−1 2 around codewords are disjoint, and therefore one can uniquely correct up to so many errors. If we allow more than d/2 errors several decodings are possible. In many cases one can allow almost up to the distance errors and still get only few possible decodings. We say C is (p, L) list-decodable if for every y ∈ Σn there are at most L codewords z such that ag(y, z)
As always one can study the combinatorial properties of a code, or ask for an explicit decoding algorithm. If the decoding algorithm makes only few queries to the corrupted word, we say it is local. Formally, We say C has a (p, L, q, β) local list-decoding if:
• There exists a probabilistic, polynomial time oracle machine A that on input k ∈ [L] and i ∈ [n] outputs a value A * (k, i) ∈ Σ. A can make at mostueries and each query is in the range [n]. 4 Implicit in the proof of Lemma 4.2.
• For every deterministic function y : [n] → Σ and every x ∈ Σ n such that ag(y, C(x)) ≥ p, there exists k ∈ [L] such that for every i ∈ [n], PrA[A y (k, i) = x(i)] ≥ β.
Sudan, Trevisan and Vadhan proved:
Theorem 4.1. [27] For every δ = δ(n) > 0, there exists an explicit [n, n] 2 binary code with output lengthn = poly(n, 1 δ ) and poly(n) encoding time, that is (p = 1 2 +δ, L = poly(n), q = poly(log n, 1 δ ), β = 1 − δ) local list-decodable. 5 In our case we do not have access to a deterministic function y : [n] → Σ, but rather to a probabilistic procedure that has high on average success probability. We are given a probabilistic oracle O :
We would like to do local list-decoding when given access to O. Formally, Definition 4.2. (probabilistic oracle, local list-decoding) Let C : Σ n → Σn. We say C has a (p, L, q, β) probabilistic oracle, local list-decoding if:
• There exists a probabilistic, polynomial time oracle machine A that on input k ∈ [L] and i ∈ [n] outputs a value A * (k, i) ∈ Σ. A can make at mostueries and each query is in the range [n].
• For every probabilistic oracle O : [n] → Σ and every
If we are just interested in list-decoding (with no restriction on the number of queries) then list decoding a probabilistic oracle is essentially the same as list decoding a string. This is because we can sample yj = O(j), for every query j ∈ [n], and then apply the list decoding algorithm on y. By Chernoff, with high probability, the sampled string y has high agreement with C(x) and therefore the string x appears somewhere in the output list of y.
The above argument does not work for local list-decoding. Here we need the index k to depend on O alone, and not on the sampled string y or the index i. This is an essential requirement, as in local list-decoding we do not reconstruct the whole string x, but rather a single bit xi of it. The above argument therefore does not work, as it may happen that the index of x in the list of y depends on the sampled string y, and not just on O as required by the definition.
Luckily, going back to the construction of [27] one can check that essentially the same analysis shows that: 6 Theorem 4.2. (based on [27] ) For every δ = δ(n) > 0, there exists an explicit [n, n] 2 binary code with output length n = poly(n, 1 δ ) and poly(n) encoding time, that is (p = 1 2 + δ, L = poly(n), q = poly(log n, 1 δ ), β = 1 − δ) probabilistic oracle, local list-decodable.
BLACK-BOX PRGS
Trevisan showed that good classical black-box PRGs give rise to good classical extractors. In this section we show that good classical black-box PRGs with few queries give rise to good classical extractors against quantum storage.
We begin with a purely classical definition: 
We call R the reconstruction algorithm. Sometimes we omit R and say G f is a black-box ( , p)-PRG, meaning that there exists some reconstruction algorithm such that
Trevisan [28] showed that black-box pseudorandom generators give rise to extractors. We show they actually give rise to extractors against quantum storage, alas their quality depends on the number of oracle calls in the reconstruction algorithm.
Proposition 5.1. (generalizing [28] ) Let G f , R be as above.
Suppose (G f , R) is a black-box ( , p = 1 − δ)-PRG with a advice bits andueries. Then E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m defined by E(f, y) = G f (y) is a (k, b, 2 ) strong extractor against quantum storage, for k = Ω( log n log(1/4δ) (a + qb)) + log −1 .
Proof. Let T be a quantum test using b qubits of side information ρ. Let F be the set of all functions f ∈ {0, 1} n for which T -distinguishes Ut × E(f, Ut) × ρ(f ) from Ut × Um × ρ(f ). We will show |F| = 2 O((a+qb)·log(n)/log(1/4δ)) . It will then follow that for any
Thus, E is a (log |F | , b, 2 ) strong extractor against quantum storage.
We now show F is indeed small. Fix f ∈ F . Recall that T -distinguishes U t ×E(f, U t )×ρ(f ) from U t ×U m ×ρ(f ). We now define a probabilistic oracle T as follows: given an input from {0, 1} t+m , it gets as advice b qubits, and apply T on the combined state. Given the right advice (which is ρ(f )), T -distinguishes Ut × E(f, Ut) from Ut × Um. Therefore, by Definition 5.1 there exists an advice adv = adv(T, f ) ∈ {0, 1} a such that the circuit R T (adv, ·) computes f : [n] → {0, 1} withueries to T and worst-case (over i) success probability p.
We replace each of theueries to the probabilistic oracle T with a quantum circuit acting on its classical input and an independent b-qubit state that is initialized to ρ(f ). Thus, altogether, the circuit uses qb qubits of side information (plus a bits of classical advice). Notice that because the inputs to the different queries are in product state, the answers to theueries are indeed independent (as required from a probabilistic oracle). The resulting quantum circuit recovers the bits of f : [n] → {0, 1} with probability p (worstcase over i). Thus, F has a random access code of length a + qb and worst-case success p = 1 − δ. By Theorem 3.2, item (2), a + qb = Ω( log(1/4δ) log n log|F|) as desired. Thus, we reduced the problem of finding extractors against quantum storage to the classical question of finding good black-box PRG with few queries. In the next section we will prove:
log m ) and q = poly(log n, m ) queries.
Plugging Thm 5.1 into Proposition 5.1 we get Theorem 1.1.
A black-box PRG with few queries
Trevisan's PRG [28] is based on the Nisan-Wigderson PRG [22] , which has a good on average reconstruction algorithm. Formally, The NW PRG is a black-box PRG with average-case reconstruction. Specifically, for every > 0, NW f :[n]→{0,1} : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m has ( , p = 1 2 + 2m ) average-case reconstruction with a = O(m 2 ) advice bits and t = O( log 2 n log m ). The NW reconstruction algorithm uses exactly one oracle call to the distinguishing algorithm. Trevisan used that to prove the following: Proof. Suppose some T -breaks the PRG TR f = NW C(f ) . W.l.o.g. we can assume T is deterministic. Letf = C(f ) ∈ {0, 1}n. Given the right advice adv = adv(f, T ) to R, R T (adv, ·) is a deterministic function computingf i with average success probability p over i ∈ [n], and using only one query to T . The advice to the new reconstruction algorithm R includes the string adv. R uses the reconstruction algorithm R T (adv, ·) on each j ∈ [n]. The resulting string y ∈ {0, 1}n has ( 1 2 + δ)n agreement withf . We now use the list decoding algorithm to get a list of up to L codewords in C that are 1 2 + δ close to y. We know f is in the list. By adding log(L) bits to the advice, we can let the advice tell us which of the codewords in the list is f . We have recovered f using a + log L advice bits andn queries.
Trevisan could toleraten queries. We, however, in light of Proposition 5.1, need to reduce the number of queries. We still want a worst-case reconstruction. The idea is to take C to be a locally list-decodable code. As our oracle is a probabilistic function what we actually need is a probabilistic oracle, locally list-decodable code. This leads to:
Lemma 5.2. (worst-case to average-case reduction for blackbox PRG using only few queries) Assume (G f , R) is a blackbox ( , 1 2 + δ)-PRG with average-case reconstruction using a advice bits and a single query. Let C be a (p = 1 2 + δ, L, q, β) probabilistic oracle, local list-decodable binary code. Define TR f (y) = NW C(f ) (y). Then TR f is a black-box ( , β)-PRG with a + log L advice bits andueries.
Proof. Suppose T -breaks the PRG TR f = NW C(f ) . Letf = C(f ). Given the right advice adv = adv(f, T ) to R, R T (adv, i) computesf i with average success probability p = 1 2 + δ over i ∈ [n] and a single query to T . The advice to the new reconstruction algorithm R includes the string adv.
Now assume we ask R for the value of f i , i ∈ [n], i.e., we wish to compute R T (adv, i). We do that as follows. We apply the probabilistic oracle, local list-decoding algorithm of C, and getueries i1, . . . , iq ∈ [n] tof = C(f ). We answer the j'th query with the probabilistic oracle R T (adv, ij) and we output the decoding result. By the probabilistic oracle, local list-decoding property, for every i ∈ [n] the reconstruction oracle R T , with additionally the right k ∈ [L], outputs the right answer with probability at least β.
Putting it together, we prove Theorem 5.1
Proof. Let > 0, m ≤ n. Let NW f :[n]→{0,1} : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} m be the Nisan-Wigderson PRG with a = O(m 2 ) advice bits and t = O( log 2 n log m ). Nisan and Wigderson showed that NW f is a black-box ( , 1 2 + δ) PRG with average reconstruction and δ = 2m .
Let C be the (p = 1 2 +δ, L = poly(n), q = poly(log n, 1 δ ), β = 1−δ) probabilistic oracle, local list-decodable binary code of 
OPEN PROBLEMS
The ideal solution to the problem of classical extractors against quantum storage is to find a natural, generic transformation from a strong extractor to a strong extractor against quantum storage with about the same parameters. Gavinsky et. al. [10] showed this is impossible. Is there a natural class of constructions that does hold against quantum storage? Even if not, a natural objective is to prove that many of the current explicit extractors (and in particular [19, 12, 8] ) are good even against quantum storage.
The parameters given in Theorem 1.1 can probably be improved. It would be interesting to construct an extractor against quantum storage with logarithmic seed length and arbitrarily small polynomial error, as this may serve as a building block in other constructions.
Finally, in this paper we dealt with quantum adversaries that hold at most b qubits of storage. A more general scenario, that is not covered by our results, is one where the adversary is not limited by the number of qubits it holds, but rather by the amount of information it may hold about the input source, which can be measured using smooth minentropy. This more general setting naturally appears in certain scenarios (e.g., in algorithms for the bounded storage model). It would be interesting to extend the results of this paper to hold even against this stronger adversary.
